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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 Russell Freed pled guilty to multiple offenses involving the possession and 
distribution of child pornography.  He was sentenced to a prison term of 20 years, well 
below the life imprisonment sentence recommended by application of the United States 
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Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”).  Freed appeals his sentence, arguing that the 
District Court committed procedural error by not considering all the pertinent sentencing 
factors and by failing to explain why the mandatory minimum prison term of 15 years 
that applied in this case was inadequate.  He also asserts that the 20 year-prison term is 
substantively unreasonable.  Following a comprehensive review of the record, we 
conclude that the District Court did indeed consider all the pertinent sentencing factors, 
that it gave more than an adequate explanation for its sentencing decision, and that the 20 
year-prison term is not substantively unreasonable given the horrendous nature of Freed’s 
conduct.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
I.  
 We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case.  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.  
 Some time in 2010, Freed found a cell phone belonging to his then 15 or 16 year 
old stepdaughter and containing sexually explicit pictures of her and her teenage friends.  
After obtaining the cell phone images, Freed opened a Facebook account and a fake 
email address in his stepdaughter’s name.  He also set up email addresses in the names of 
nonexistent individuals and purchased a prepaid cell phone that he used to pose as 
fictional persons.  Freed maintained control over the prepaid cell phone as well as the 
fake Facebook account and email addresses.  He contacted the girls in the photos 
contained on his stepdaughter’s cell phone using the phony forms of communication in 
order to obtain more sexually explicit pictures of them by posing as one of their peers or 
by pretending to be his stepdaughter. 
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 Once a girl had sent him photos, Freed would extort, or attempt to extort, the 
production of more images by threatening to publish images already in his possession.  
When one victim denied Freed’s request for additional photos, Freed distributed explicit 
pictures of the girl to her family and classmates.   
Freed even targeted and tormented his stepdaughter, who lived with Freed for over 
10 years.  Not knowing that Freed was the person extorting her for sexually explicit 
pictures, the stepdaughter confided in Freed about the “person” who was threatening her 
and told him that she was contemplating suicide as a result.  Freed advised his 
stepdaughter to comply with the “person’s” demands.  He then continued extorting her 
for more sexually explicit images.  
 Freed’s conduct eventually became the subject of a law enforcement investigation.  
On May 25, 2011, the Pennsylvania State Police conducted a planned traffic stop of 
Freed.  Inside his vehicle, police found the prepaid cell phone used to solicit, extort and 
receive sexually explicit photos of Freed’s stepdaughter and her peers.  The phone 
contained about 700 such images.  Law enforcement officials found similar photos on 
Facebook and email accounts that Freed had created.  On July 21, 2011, a grand jury 
sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a seven-count indictment against 
Freed, charging him with two counts of Production of Child Pornography, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) and (e), two counts of Attempted Production of Child Pornography, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) and (e), two counts of  Distribution and Receipt of 
Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of Possession 
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of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  Freed pled guilty to all 
seven counts on March 1, 2012. 
 Following Freed’s guilty plea, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”).  Applying the Guidelines, the PSR calculated Freed’s base 
offense level of 42.  The PSR then applied a three-level decrease for acceptance of 
responsibility, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b), as well as a five-level increase because 
Freed had “engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1).  Freed’s total offense level was 44, and combined with a criminal 
history category of I, his advisory Guidelines range was life imprisonment.  
 Freed filed a sentencing memorandum requesting that the District Court sentence 
him to the mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment.  He argued for this 
substantial downward variance from his advisory Guidelines range based on the 
anonymous nature of the offense as well as his personal background and family situation.  
Freed asserted that this case is not one “where young children are forced to submit to 
unimaginable sexual exploitation . . . .”  (App. 82.)  Rather, Freed argued, “[t]his is a 
sexting case,” for which a 15 year sentence is reasonable.  (Id.)  Freed also filed a report 
from Dr. Allen Pass, a psychologist who treated Freed as part of a “Structured Sexual 
Offender Treatment Program,” indicating that Freed presented a medium to low risk of 
reoffending.   
 Despite Freed’s Guidelines range, the government did not ask the District Court to 
impose a life sentence.  The government did, however, request “a sentence substantially 
above the statutory minimum.”  (App. 147.)  In its own sentencing memorandum, the 
5 
 
government argued that all of the relevant sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) supported a sentence well in excess of the 15 year mandatory minimum.  The 
government also criticized the speculative nature of reports prepared by experts such as 
Dr. Pass, which attempt to predict whether a sexual offender will commit similar crimes 
in the future.  Although the government had not yet had a chance to review Dr. Pass’s 
report, because it was filed under seal, the government argued that “[t]o the extent that 
recidivism predictions are relevant . . . [they] are too speculative to engender much 
confidence,” regardless of the expertise of the person making the prediction.  (App. 144.)  
 In addition to his own testimony, Freed presented several witnesses at the 
sentencing hearing, which was held on October 1, 2012.  Freed’s co-worker, sister, 
mother, father and wife all discussed Freed’s positive attributes and asked the District 
Court for leniency.  Dr. Pass also testified that Freed presented a medium to low risk of 
reoffending and that, in his opinion, Freed suffered from body dysmorphic disorder,
1
 and 
was not a pedophile.
 2
  On cross examination, Dr. Pass acknowledged that sexual offender 
recidivism statistics are inherently flawed and that Freed’s body dysmorphic disorder did 
not cause him to commit his crimes.  
                                                          
1
  At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Pass explained that individuals with body 
dysmorphic disorder “have real or imagined problems with their self imagery,” which 
“erodes their self-confidence over the course of time such that they prefer to engage in 
things that are more reclusive in conduct.”  (App. 207). 
 
2
  According to Dr. Pass, in order to be diagnosed as a pedophile, an individual must 
engage in some sort of physical contact with a child under the age of 13.  Because 
Freed’s victims were over the age of 13 and he did not physically contact them, Dr. Pass 
concluded that there was no evidence supporting the conclusion that Freed is a pedophile.   
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 After receiving all the evidence and listening to the arguments of counsel, the 
District Court embarked on a comprehensive analysis of the pertinent sentencing factors 
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The District Court acknowledged a number of mitigating 
factors that warranted a substantial variance below the advisory Guidelines range of life 
imprisonment.  But the District Court also recognized the heinous nature of Freed’s 
criminal conduct, in that he had exploited his own stepdaughter and inflicted horrendous 
damage on his teenage victims.  Ultimately, the District Court concluded that Freed’s 
conduct, appropriately described as “unimaginable, unforgettable, and without 
justification under any legal or moral code,” (App. 270), warranted a sentence of 20 years 
in prison.  This appeal followed.   
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S. C. § 3742(a)(1).   Our standard of review 
depends upon whether Freed preserved his challenges to the sentence.  “If so, we review 
for abuse of discretion; if not, we review for plain error.”  United States v. Russell, 564 
F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2009).  The parties dispute whether Freed sufficiently preserved 
his sentencing challenges to avoid plain-error review.  We need not resolve that dispute 
because Freed’s claims fail under the more lenient abuse-of-discretion standard.  
 When reviewing a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion, 
our analysis proceeds in two stages.  Unites States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).  We first review for procedural error – for example, “failing to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 
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adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .”  Id.   If we find no procedural error, we 
then determine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable.  Id. 
Turning to the first step of our review, we require that district courts set forth 
sufficient reasoning to satisfy us that they have “considered the parties’ arguments and 
[have] a reasoned basis for exercising [their] own legal decisionmaking authority.”  
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).  Freed argues that the District Court committed procedural 
error by focusing on the nature and circumstances of the offense to the exclusion of the 
other § 3553(a) factors, and by failing to explain why a prison term of 15 years was 
inadequate.  In particular, Freed asserts that the District Court failed to give meaningful 
consideration to Dr. Pass’s report and testimony indicating that Freed suffered from body 
dysmorphic disorder, and that he presented a low to medium risk of recidivism.  We 
disagree. 
 The record makes clear that the District Court gave thoughtful consideration to 
each § 3553(a) factor.  In addition to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
victim impact statements, the District Court made explicit reference to Freed’s mental 
and physical condition, as well as Freed’s education and vocational skills.  The Court also 
specifically discussed Dr. Pass’s opinion that Freed suffered from body dysmorphic 
disorder and presented a low risk for sexual offense relapse.  
 Contrary to Freed’s assertions, the District Court did not overlook any mitigating 
factor in Freed’s background.  It concluded, however, that “[w]hile there are mitigating 
factors in [the] 3553(a) analysis, . . . they are not of a degree or nature that warrant an 
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extreme departure or variance from the recommended guideline sentence to the statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence.”  (App. 270.)    
 Based on our independent review of the record, we are satisfied that the District 
Court gave meaningful consideration to each of the § 3553(a) factors.  In fact, the District 
Court’s thorough review of the evidence in arriving at its sentence was commendable.  
There was thus no procedural error.   
Nor was the 20 year prison term substantively unreasonable.  In light of Freed’s  
outrageous conduct, it simply cannot be said that “no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on [Freed] for the reasons the district court provided.”  
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence.  
  
